![]() ![]() Pgjdbc is the offical PostgreSQL JDBC Driver. This issue has been resolved in version 2.5.1. Users must: Require JWT login) and be using PostgreSQL to be affected. ![]() The problem occurs in the following code in server/service/system/sys_auto_code_pgsql.go, which means that PostgreSQL must be used as the database for this vulnerability to occur. Gin-vue-admin is a backstage management system based on vue and gin, which separates the front and rear of the full stack. It is also possible to achieve remote code execution in the default installation (PostgreSQL) by exploiting this issue. Network Olympus version 1.8.0 allows an authenticated admin user to inject SQL queries in '/api/eventinstance' via the 'sqlparameter' JSON parameter. Given all three prerequisites, this flaw allows an attacker to run arbitrary code as the victim role, which may be a superuser. This attack requires permission to create non-temporary objects in at least one schema, the ability to lure or wait for an administrator to create or update an affected extension in that schema, and the ability to lure or wait for a victim to use the object targeted in CREATE OR REPLACE or CREATE IF NOT EXISTS. There are no known workarounds for this issue.Ī vulnerability was found in PostgreSQL. Patched versions will be released as `42.2.26` and `42.4.1`. In that situation it may be possible for the malicious user to craft a schema that causes the application to execute commands as the privileged user. A JDBC application that executes as a privileged user querying database schemas owned by potentially malicious less-privileged users would be vulnerable. Note that the application's JDBC user and the schema owner need not be the same. The attack requires the attacker to trick the user into executing SQL against a table name who's column names would contain the malicious SQL and subsequently invoke the `refreshRow()` method on the ResultSet. User application that do invoke that method are impacted if the underlying database that they are querying via their JDBC application may be under the control of an attacker. ![]() User applications that do not invoke the `ResultSet.refreshRow()` method are not impacted. This could lead to executing additional SQL commands as the application's JDBC user. The PGJDBC implementation of the `()` method is not performing escaping of column names so a malicious column name that contains a statement terminator, e.g. PostgreSQL JDBC Driver (PgJDBC for short) allows Java programs to connect to a PostgreSQL database using standard, database independent Java code. IBM Spectrum Copy Data Management 2.2.0.0 through 2.2.15.0 could allow a remote attacker to view product configuration information stored in PostgreSQL, which could be used in further attacks against the system. There is no known workaround, but the patch sets listed above will fully patch the vulnerability. The vulnerability has been patched in version 2.x and 1.19.x. The vulnerability allows for an attacker to take over any account without the involvement of the victim, and as such, the remediation should be applied immediately (either via NodeBB upgrade or cherry-pick of the specific changeset. This vulnerability impacts all installations of NodeBB. `utils.generateUUID`, a helper function available in essentially all versions of NodeBB (as far back as v1.0.1 and potentially earlier) used a cryptographically insecure Pseudo-random number generator (`Math.random()`), which meant that a specially crafted script combined with multiple invocations of the password reset functionality could enable an attacker to correctly calculate the reset code for an account they do not have access to. It utilizes web sockets for instant interactions and real-time notifications. NodeBB Forum Software is powered by Node.js and supports either Redis, MongoDB, or a PostgreSQL database. The issue has been fully patched in version 1.17.2. This re-exposed a vulnerability in that a specially crafted Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack could theoretically take over another user account during the single sign-on process. Due to an unnecessarily strict conditional in the code handling the first step of the SSO process, the pre-existing logic that added (and later checked) a nonce was inadvertently rendered opt-in instead of opt-out. ![]() ![]()
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